At the threshold of the new millennium, Côte d'Ivoire inherited a relatively developed industrial fabric for the region. Abidjan and Bouaké constituted the two nerve centers of a secondary sector which had prospered during previous decades, backed by a powerful agro-industry and diversified processing industries. Agro-industry then represented around 50% of the industrial sector, driven by the cocoa, coffee, oil palm and cotton sectors. Ivory Coast was the world's leading producer of cocoa and intended to capitalize on this agricultural income to fuel local processing with higher added value. But from 2000, the alarm signals were going off. The GDP growth rate was negative that year, before rising very slightly to +0.1% in 2001. The ambient political instability, born from tensions around Ivoirianness and chaotic government transitions, weakened the business climate and dissuaded foreign investors. The country entered a long period of turbulence from which it would only truly emerge a decade later.

2002: the coup de grace for the industry

On September 19, 2002, an attempted coup d'état transformed into an armed rebellion and split the country in two. The North, under the control of the Forces Nouvelles, and the South, governed by Abidjan. This territorial divide would have devastating consequences on the national industrial system. Bouaké, the country's second economic city and major industrial hub, practically ceased to function. Factories were looted, others were forced to close due to lack of supply of raw materials and security for their employees. The textile sector was the most glaring illustration of this. The Robert Gonfreville factory, flagship of the Ivorian cotton industry and sub-regional leader, saw its workforce decline dramatically. Before the crisis, it employed 2,000 full-time employees and produced 10 tonnes of cotton per day. After 2002, the factory was only operating at 40% of its capacity. Across the entire textile sector, around 80% of businesses disappeared, leading to the loss of nearly 10,000 jobs. The far North, the cotton production zone par excellence, was besieged by rebel forces, cutting factories off from their source of supply.

Sham growth and worrying indicators

Despite the partial resumption of activities from 2004, with a growth rate of +1.6%, the Ivorian economy was struggling to regain sustained industrial momentum. Over the entire decade 2000-2010, the average growth rate of real GDP did not exceed 1.3%, a derisory figure for a country which displayed ambitions for emergence. Investments, although slightly increasing (from 207 billion FCFA in 2000 to 335 billion in 2009), remained insufficient to revive an industry that was running out of steam. The energy sector perfectly illustrated the structural limits of this period. Electricity exports, which reached 700 gigawatt hours (GWh) in 2002, fell to 32 million kilowatt hours in 2009, due to lack of investment in maintenance and new production capacities. At the beginning of 2010, the country experienced its first major rotating power cuts, forcing the government to rent, at great expense, diesel generators. These power outages directly contributed to the estimated drop in GDP to 3% in 2010, compared to 3.8% the previous year. For an already weakened industry, this energy shortage represented an additional insurmountable obstacle.

Agro-industry, the only lifeline

In this dark picture, agro-industry constituted the main factor of resilience. The cocoa sector, the backbone of the Ivorian economy, has maintained high production levels despite political upheavals. Cocoa grinding capacity increased from 133,000 tonnes in 2008-2009 to around 260,000 tonnes in 2010-2011, a sign that local processing was progressing, timidly but really. International players like Cargill, Olam and Cémoi continued to operate on Ivorian territory, maintaining a primary processing activity in Abidjan, spared by the fighting. The oil palm sector also experienced relative stability, maintaining a decent rate of investment during the 2000s. These agro-industrial sectors, driven by global demand, played the role of an economic shock absorber, while contributing to the non-total collapse of an otherwise bloodless secondary sector. They represented 75% of the national manufacturing industry, confirming the mono-dependence of the Ivorian industrial model with regard to the transformation of agricultural raw materials. focused on preserving public finances. Tax revenues increased significantly, from 1,035 billion FCFA in 2000 to 1,795 billion in 2009, an increase of 73%. Nominal GDP, for its part, increased from 7,630 billion FCFA in 2000 to 10,486 billion in 2008, then 10,925 billion in 2009. These figures demonstrate a certain economic resistance, but they mask the reality of a deeply degraded productive system, incapable of generating inclusive and structural growth. The end of the decade was marked by the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011, which dealt the final blow to what remained of industrial dynamism. The Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage (SIR), unable to buy crude oil in this context of international sanctions, suspended all its activities in early 2011. The banking system faltered, with several large banks temporarily closing their branches. The recession reached -6.6% in 2011, completing the closure of a dark parenthesis.

In short, this period will remain in the economic history of Côte d'Ivoire as a period of missed appointments. The country had the necessary assets (abundant natural resources, solid agro-industrial fabric, strategic geographical position in West Africa) to initiate a real industrial upgrade. However, political-military instability has acted as a systematic repellent to investments, a destroyer of jobs and a paralyzer of entrepreneurial initiative.