There was a time when Ivory Coast embodied African success. Between 1960 and 1978, driven by the export of coffee and cocoa, it experienced spectacular growth which earned it the title of “Ivorian miracle”. But the sudden fall in commodity prices at the end of the 1970s, combined with a policy of massive debt, threw the country into a severe economic crisis. It is in this context of vulnerability that the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) are making their decisive entry onto the Ivorian scene. In 1981, under pressure from international creditors, Abidjan signed its first Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Between 1980 and 1993, Côte d'Ivoire concluded no less than five SAPs with these institutions. The logic is clear: in exchange for funding, the Ivorian state must submit to a set of neoliberal conditionalities (reduction of public spending, privatization, liberalization of markets). Economic supervision is established permanently in Abidjan.

Houphouët-Boigny under pressure

The relationship between the Ivorian government and the international financial institutions is not from the outset one of total submission. Until the end of the 1980s, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny partially resisted the rigor required, benefiting from a still favorable balance of power thanks to the support of Paris. France, faithful to its African networks, compensates for shortfalls behind the scenes. It paid Côte d'Ivoire 78.2 billion CFA francs in 1992 and 126.7 billion in 1993 to enable it to meet its external deadlines. But financial institutions are gradually hardening their position. One of the explicit strategies of the IMF and the World Bank is, according to analysts, to weaken the presidential power which they hold responsible for the depth of the crisis. In 1989-1990, under this increased pressure, Houphouët-Boigny resigned itself to halving the price guaranteed to cocoa producers. This sacrifice breaks the historic alliance of the regime with the planters (pillar of Ivorian clientelism) and triggers widespread social protest.

Adjustment as a political detonator

The political consequences of this period of austerity are considerable. In 1990, the economic crisis caused by adjustment measures caused two major upheavals. We are witnessing the establishment of the multiparty system and the appointment of a Prime Minister. This position is entrusted to Alassane Dramane Ouattara, then governor of the BCEAO and former director of the Africa department at the IMF, a choice which alone illustrates the influence of the Bretton Woods institutions on Ivorian governance. In 1992, after failing to achieve the agreed objectives, the IMF and the World Bank suspended their financing to Côte d'Ivoire, dragging all other donors in their wake. The country finds itself practically isolated on the international financial scene. Only France maintains its support, thus delaying a total break. This suspension marks the climax of a standoff which reveals all the fragility of Ivorian economic sovereignty.

Reforms with devastating effects

On the social level, the results of the SAPs are heavy. The removal of subsidies, cuts to public services and the hasty opening to imports are undermining local productive bases. The programs accentuate Côte d'Ivoire's specialization in the export of raw materials, locking its economy into a subordinate position within global value chains. The impoverishment of a large part of the population is accelerating, while union and political repression is intensifying. In the agricultural and commercial sector, liberalization also requires profound restructuring. The gradual disappearance of Caistab (the stabilization fund) allows American multinationals to impose themselves on the cocoa market to the detriment of less competitive national operators. The “victory” of financial institutions thus results in the replacement of a state monopoly by a private foreign oligopoly, far from the promises of efficiency and growth announced. Also, the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, a decision taken under the combined leadership of the IMF and France, marks an additional stage in this decade of turbulence. If it temporarily restores competitiveness to Ivorian exports, its effects on the purchasing power of households are immediately painful. 

To conclude, the 1990s left Côte d'Ivoire with a persistent external debt, a weakened social fabric and a structural dependence on international financial institutions. The sharpest criticisms underline the fundamental inadequacy between the institutional reforms proposed by the Bretton Woods institutions and the real needs of the country. This inability to manage from the outside processes as complex as economic and political reforms constitutes, according to many analysts, the central lesson of this period, a lesson that the African continent still carries in its flesh.